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Résumé : Au cours des dernières décennies, la philosophie des sciences est
devenue la philosophie des sciences particulières. En conséquence, certaines
des questions majeures de la philosophie des sciences sont adressées à la re-
cherche en nanosciences et technologie. C’est le cas notamment des questions
concernant la nature de la connaissance, le rôle de la théorie, les pratiques
expérimentales et observationnelles. Ces questions habituelles suscitent des
réponses inattendues, suggérant que la nanotechnoscience est un exemple non
pas d’une science mais d’une technoscience.
Abstract: In recent decades, the philosophy of science has become philosophy
of the special sciences. Accordingly, some of the main questions of the
philosophy of science are brought to nanoscale research. These are questions
regarding the nature of knowledge, the role of theory, accounts of experimental
and observational practice, and others. As it turns out, however, the familiar
questions elicit unfamiliar answers, suggesting that nanotechnoscience is an
instance not of science but of technoscience.
“Nanotechnoscience” is more than shorthand for “nanoscience and nan-
otechnologies” but signifies a mode of research that is neither science nor
engineering1. Peter Galison, for example, speaks of an “engineering way of
being within the sciences” when he characterizes nanotechnological research:
A focus on novel effects, materials, and objects, but constructed
through an engineering way of being that values the making and
linking of structures with little regard for the older fascination
with existence for its own sake. [Galison 2017, 25]
Philosophia Scientiæ, 23(1), 2019, 99–119.
1. This text integrates, revisits, updates, and revises two earlier publica-
tions: “Philosophy of Nanotechnoscience” [Nordmann 2008], and “Philosophy of
Technoscience in the Regime of Vigilance” [Nordmann 2010].
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Along such lines, science and technoscience can be distinguished as follows:
Science uses experiments, measurements, research technologies in order to
produce representations and forge an agreement between theory and reality,
mind and world. Technoscience uses theories, models, and scientific knowledge
in order to achieve predictive and technical control and make things work
[Bensaude-Vincent, Loeve et al. 2017, 3–5]. As for the philosophy of science
and the philosophy of technoscience, they ask many of the same questions but
answer them differently. This will now be shown in a cursory way for the
philosophy of nanotechnoscience and its seven unfamiliar responses to seven
familiar questions:
1. What is the role of theory and theory-development in nanoscale
research, and what kinds of theories are needed for nanotechnological
development?
2. What are the preferred modes of reasoning, methods and associated
tools in nanoscientific research?
3. What is the domain of objects that are of interest to nanotechnoscience?
4. What kind of knowledge do nanotechnoscientific researchers typically
produce and communicate?
5. What kind of basic science could provide a foundation for nanotechno-
science?
6. What sorts of experiments are performed in nanotechnological research,
what is its mode of experimentation?
7. What is observation, how do nanotechnology researchers observe their
experiments and see with and through their instruments?
All seven questions are of primarily epistemological and methodological
significance—they tell us what NanoTechnoScience is in terms of presupposi-
tions and aspirations, epistemic values and practices. And yet, the answers
to these questions have societal dimensions and implicate ethical or political
values. Here, these will only be hinted at by way of a closing remark at the
end of each section.2
1 Closed theories
In the late 1940s, physicist Werner Heisenberg introduced the notion of “closed
theories” [Heisenberg 1974]. In particular, he referred to four closed theories:
2. While there may be such a thing as pure or value-free science, there is no
pure technoscience. For a more extensive consideration of the intersection between
epistemology and ethics, broadly conceived, see the publications cited in the previous
note.
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Newtonian mechanics, Maxwell’s theory with the special the-
ory of relativity, thermodynamics and statistical mechanics,
non-relativistic quantum-mechanics with atomic physics and
chemistry.
These theories he considered to be closed in four complementary respects:
1. Their historical development has come to an end, they are finished or
reached their final form.
2. They constitute a hermetically closed domain in that the theory defines
conditions of applicability such that the theory will be true wherever its
concepts can be applied.
3. They are immune to criticism; problems that arise in contexts of
application are deflected to auxiliary theories and hypotheses or to the
specifics of the set-up, the instrumentation, etc.
4. They are forever valid: wherever and whenever experience can be
described with the concepts of such a theory, the laws postulated by
this theory will be proven correct [Heisenberg 1974].
All this holds for nanotechnoscience: It draws on an available repertoire
of theories that are closed in regard to the nanoscale, and it is concerned
neither with the critique or further elaboration of these theories, nor with the
construction of theories of its own.3 This is not to say, however, that closed
theories are simply “applied” in nanotechnoscience.
When Heisenberg refers to the hermetically closed domain of closed
theories, he states merely that the theory will be true where its concepts can
be applied and leaves quite open the domain of its actual applicability. Indeed,
he suggests that this domain is so small that a “closed theory does not contain
any absolutely certain statement about the world of experience” [Heisenberg
1974]. Even for a closed theory, then, it remains to be determined how and to
what extent its concepts can be applied to the world of experience. Thus, there
is no preexisting domain of phenomena to which a closed theory is applied.
Instead, it is a question of success, that is, of calibration, tuning, or mutual
adjustment to what extent phenomena of experience can be assimilated into
the domain of the theory such that its concepts can be applied to them.
This notion of “application” has been the topic of recent discussions—but
it does not capture the case of nanotechnoscience. Here, researchers are not
3. There is more to be said about the lack of theory development in and for
nanotechnoscience. One counterexample might be the discovery and subsequent
theoretical work on the giant magnetoresistance effect [Wilholt 2006]. Also, there
have been calls for the development of theory specifically suited to the complexities
of the nanocosm [Roukes 2001], [Eberhart 2002]. These voices remain isolated,
however. Also, if there were theories of and for nanotechnology, would they describe
an underlying structure and reality, or would they anticipate a world that can arise
only under conditions of perfect technical control at the vanishing point of engineering
[Nordmann 2017]?
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trying to bring nanoscale phenomena into the domain of quantum chemistry or
fluid dynamics or the like. They are not using models to extend the domain of
application of a closed theory or general law. They are not engaged in fitting
the theory to reality and vice versa. Instead, they take nanoscale phenomena
as parts of a highly complex mesocosm between classical and quantum regimes.
They have no theories that are especially suited to accounting for this
complexity, no theories, for example, of structure-property relations at the
nanoscale.4 Nanoscale researchers understand, in particular, that the various
closed theories have been formulated for far better-behaved phenomena in far
more easily controlled laboratory settings. Rather than claim that the complex
phenomena of the nanoscale can be described in such a way that the concepts of
the closed theory now apply to them, they draw on closed theories eclectically,
stretching them beyond their intended scope of application to do some partial
explanatory work at the nanoscale.5 A particular measure of the flow of current
through an organic-inorganic molecular complex might be reconstructed
quantum-chemically or in the classical terms of electrical engineering—and
yet, the two accounts do not compete against each other for offering a better
or best explanation [Nordmann 2004].
Armed with theories that are closed relative to the nanoscale, researchers
are well equipped to handle phenomena in need of explanation, but they are
also aware that they bring crude instruments to bear that are not made
specifically for the task. Accordingly, the business of explanation becomes
transformed into one of re-construction. Rather than offering a theoretical
description that satisfies the human intellect, there is a demonstration that bits
and pieces of theory can be joined together or modularized so as to yield the
observed event in a computer model. If the language of “fitting” derives from
a representational idiom of making a picture that fits the situation and vice
versa, this practice of “stretching” emphasizes that theories provide modular
components for the re-construction of a process in silico. Indeed, nanoscale
research is characterized by a tacit consensus according to which the following
three propositions hold true simultaneously:
1. There is a fundamental difference between quantum and classical
regimes such that classical theories cannot describe quantum phenomena
and such that quantum theories are inappropriate for describing classical
phenomena.
4. The term “complexity” is used here in a deliberately non-technical manner. The
complexity at the nanoscale is one of great messiness, of too many relevant variables
and properties, and multiple complicated interactions.
5. There is another dimension to this: In the standard case of fitting theory to
reality and vice versa, the problem concerns ways to compensate for the idealizations
or abstractions that are involved in formulating a theory and constructing a
model. However, classical theories do not abstract from nanoscale properties and
processes, nor do they refer to idealizations of nanoscale phenomena. Instead, in
nanotechnoscience the challenge is that of crossing from the intended domain of a
classical theory into quite another domain.
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2. The nanoscale holds intellectual and technical interest because it is an
“exotic territory” [Roukes 2001], where classical properties like color and
conductivity emerge when one moves up from quantum levels, and where
phenomena like quantized conductance emerge as one moves down to the
quantum regime.
3. Nanoscale researchers can eclectically draw upon a large toolkit of
theories from the quantum and classical regimes to re-construct—by
stretching rather than fitting—novel properties, behaviors, or processes.
Taken together, these three statements express a characteristic tension
concerning nanotechnology, namely that on the one hand it is thought to
be strange, novel, and surprising while on the other hand it is familiar and
manageable. More significantly for present purposes, however, they express
an analogous tension regarding available theories: They are thought to be
inadequate on the one hand, but quite sufficient on the other. The profound
difference between classical and quantum regimes highlights what makes the
nanocosm special and interesting—but this difference boils down to a matter
of expediency and taste when it comes to choosing modular bits and pieces
of theory from the perspectives of classical or quantum physics. Put another
way: What makes nanoscale phenomena scientifically interesting is that they
cannot be adequately described from either perspective, but what makes
nanotechnologies possible is that the classical and quantum approaches prove
resourceful enough when it comes to reconstructing these phenomena.
As for the societal dimensions of all this—theories that are closed rela-
tive to the nanoscale and stretched to provide explanations, do not suggest
limits of what is technically possible. Especially in the early days of nan-
otechnology, this gave rise to an image of nanotechnology as an unlimited
storehouse of goods.
2 Qualitative reasoning
As was shown above, Heisenberg considered the extent to which phenomena
of experience can be fitted to closed theories as “a question of success”
[Heisenberg 1974], and one can consider the extent to which elements of closed
theories can be stretched to account for phenomena of experience in the same
terms. This suggests the follow-up question as to what “success” amounts
to in nanoscale research: What does it take to satisfy oneself that one has
reached a sufficiently good understanding or control of the phenomena under
investigation?
For Heisenberg himself and those philosophers of science who follow the
paradigm of theoretical physics, the question boils down to the predictive
success of quantitative science. Here, “quantitative” means more than the
employment of numbers or precision measurements. The characteristics of
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quantitative approaches include the following: First, predicted numerical
values are compared to values obtained by measurement. The reasonably
close agreement between two numbers then serves to establish the agreement
of theory and reality. Second, this quantitative agreement emphatically makes
do without any appeal to a likeness or similarity between theoretical models
and the real-world systems they are said to represent. Quantitative science is
satisfied if it reliably leads from initial conditions to accurate predictions, it
does not require that all the details of its conceptual apparatus or every term in
its equations has a counterpart in reality. Both characteristics of quantitative
science are familiar especially from 20th century theoretical physics—but do
they hold for nanotechnoscience?
Although there may not be a general answer to this question, it is fair to say
that much nanotechnoscientific research is qualitative. To be sure, phenomena
are measured and described with the utmost quantitative precision. And
yet, epistemic success consists in constructions of likeness or similarity. In
other words, in nanotechnoscience the quantitative agreement of predicted
and measured quantities is replaced by a qualitative agreement of calculated
and experimental images. One hallmark of the achievement of likeness or
similarity is the absence, even deliberate suppression of visual clues by which
to hold calculated and experimental images apart. Instead, there has been a
pronounced tendency to blend and even fuse them: The mere fact of a seamless
transition between them serves as an argument of sorts according to which the
calculated image or model captures the relevant structure or dynamics of the
experimentally observed entity or behavior.
Since an extensive analysis of this practice cannot be provided here,
a description must do. It starts with (nano)technoscientific researchers
comparing two seemingly distinct images on their displays or computer screens.
One of the displays offers a visual interpretation of the data that were
obtained through a series of measurements (e.g., by an electron or scanning
probe microscope), the other presents a dynamic simulation of the observed
process—and for this simulation to be readable as such, the simulation
software has produced a visual output that is designed to look like the
output of an electron or scanning probe microscope. Agreement between
two similarly processed images gives the researchers license to draw inferences
about probable causal processes and to suggest that they understand these
processes, perhaps creating and participating in them. The mere likeness of
the images appears to warrant inferences from the mechanism modeled in
the simulation to the mechanism responsible for the experimentally obtained
data. Accordingly—and this has not been done as yet—one could investigate
how nanoscale researchers construct mutually reinforcing likenesses, how they
calibrate not only simulations to observations and visual representations to
physical systems, but also their own devices to extant devices, their own work
to that of others, and current findings to long-term visions. This kind of
study would show that the community of researchers is not unified by an
overarching paradigm or theoretical framework but by the availability of a large
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tool-kit of theories, concepts, strategies, and techniques. Instead of theories,
it is instruments (STM, AFM, etc.), their associated software, techniques and
exemplary artefacts (buckyballs, carbon nanotubes, gold nanoshells, molecular
wires, graphene), that provide relevant common referents [Mody 2004], [Hennig
2006], [Johnson 2006], [Marcovich & Shinn 2014].
Peter Galison has referred to this qualitative orientation as “ontological
indifference”: Nanoscale research does not seek to decide what is and what
is not, what are fundamental features of the world and what is inferred or
derived [Galison 2017]. Since such questions are central in physics with its
fundamental particles and hierarchical composition of matter, how is it that
nanotechnological research can afford to do without? For example, molecular
electronics researchers may invoke more or less simplistic pictures of electron
transport but they do not reflect much on the nature and existence of electrons.
Indeed, electrons are so familiar to them that they might think of them
as ordinary macroscopic things that pass through a molecule as if it were
another material thing with a tunnel going through it [Nordmann 2004]. Many
physicists and philosophers of physics would object to such blatant disregard
for the strangely immaterial and probabilistic character of the quantum world
that is the home of electrons, orbitals, and standing electron waves [Scerri
2000], [Vermaas 2004]. Indeed, to achieve a practical understanding of electron
transport, it may be necessary to entertain more subtle accounts. However,
it is the privilege of ontologically indifferent technoscience that it can always
develop more complicated accounts as the need arises. For the time being, it
can see how far it gets with rather more simplistic pictures.6
Ontological indifference amounts to a disinterest in questions of representa-
tion and an interest, instead, in substitution and immersion. Rather than use
sparse modeling tools to economically represent salient causal features of real
systems, nanoresearchers produce in the laboratory and in their models a rich,
indeed over-saturated substitute reality. Accordingly, only after generating
a highly complex system from simple parts (e.g., a simulation model or
experimental system), they then begin to reduce complexity by observing the
behavior and parameter-dependencies not in “nature out there”, but in some
domesticated chunk of reality in the computer or in the laboratory. These
data reduction and modeling techniques, in turn, are informed by algorithms
which are concentrated forms of previously studied real systems, they are
tried and tested components of substitute realities that manage to emulate
real physical systems [Harré 2003]. In other words, there is so much reality in
their simulations or constructed experimental systems, that nanotechnology
researchers can take them for reality itself [Winsberg 2009]. They study
these substitute systems and, of course, these systems provide prototypes for
technical devices or applications. While the public is still awaiting significant
6. A particularly interesting and challenging example of this is Don Eigler’s famous
image of a quantum corral that confines a standing electron wave. The picture’s
seemingly photographic realism suggests that the quantum corral is just as thing-like
as a macroscopic pond.
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nanotechnological products to come out of the labs, the researchers in the
labs are already using nanotechnological tools to detach and manipulate more
or less self-sufficient nanotechnological systems which “only” require further
development before they can exist as useful devices outside the laboratory,
devices that not only substitute for but improve upon something in nature.
Instead of producing a symbolic picture of reality, researchers learn to
inhabit an artefactual or manufactured reality that displaces the observed
reality. At the height of contemporary scientific and technological development,
we therefore encounter a mode of thought which is characteristic of prescientific
magical thinking. The pseudo-science of physiognomy, for example, is based on
the idea that there is a meaningful likeness between the facial features and the
character of a person—both participating in the same reality of which they are
only two different aspects. With the reappearance of such forms of reasoning,
societies will need to reassess the classical ideal of critical science in the service
of Enlightenment.
3 The objects of interest
Any field of research is directed at a certain domain of objects and what unifies
this domain is a particular way of conceiving these objects. Mechanics, for
example, looks at all phenomena of motion. Everything that can be assigned
coordinates in time and space and that has mass is an object of mechanics and
is of interest in regard to those properties that make it an object of motion.
The philosophy of science articulates this world-view of mechanics and asks,
for example, to what extent certain conceptions of time and space prejudice
the investigation of objects in motion. If one now asks about nanotechnological
research, the philosophy of technoscience may offer something like the following
characterization of its domain of objects: Nanotechnological research considers
properties, traits, or features in regard primarily to their potential technical
function, and in regard only incidentally to structure.
On a first approach, one might say that nanoscience and nanotechnologies
are concerned with everything molecular or, a bit more precisely, with
the investigation and manipulation of molecular architecture—as well as
the properties or functionalities that depend on molecular architecture.
Everything that consists of atoms is thus an object of study and a possible
design target of nanoscale research. This posits a homogeneous and unbounded
space of possibility, giving rise, for example, to the notion of an all-powerful
nanotechnology as a combinatorial exercise that produces the “little BANG”
(ETC Group 2003)—since bits, atoms, neurons, genes all consist of atoms and
all of them are molecular, they all look alike to nanoscientists and engineers
who can recombine them at will. And thus, categorial distinctions of living and
inanimate, organic and inorganic, biological and technical things, of nature
and culture appear to become meaningless with the notion of an unlimited
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space of combinatorial possibilities. Though hardly any scientist believes
literally in the infinite plasticity of everything molecular, the molecular point
of view proved transgressive in many nanotechnological research programs.
It is particularly apparent where biological cells are described as factories
operating with molecular nanomachinery. Aside from challenging cultural
sensibilities and systematic attempts to capture the special character of living
beings and processes, nanotechnoscience here appears naively reductionist.
In particular, it does not usually acknowledge any influence of the context or
environment of molecular structures, thereby excluding top-down causation
from wholes to parts that would determine the properties and behaviors of
component molecules.7
Conceived as a unified enterprise with an unbounded domain of “everything
molecular”, nanotechnology fits the bill of an all-encompassing modern
technology along the lines of Heidegger’s Gestell that treats everyone and
everything as a material resource for the achievement of technical control. It
does so because it employs what one might call a “thin” conception of nature:
Nature is circumscribed by the physical laws of nature and all that accords
with these laws is natural. Thus, nanotechnology can quickly and easily
claim for itself that it always emulates nature, that it manufactures things
nanotechnologically just as nature does when it creates living organisms. This
conception, however, is too “thin” or superficial to be credible, and it suffers
from the failing that the conditions of (human) life on Earth have no particular
place in it: From the point of view of physics and the eternal immutable laws
of nature, life on Earth is contingent and not at all necessary. These laws
predate and will outlive the human species.
In contrast, a substantial, more richly detailed or “thick” conception of
nature takes as a norm the special evolved conditions that sustain life on Earth.
Here, any biomimetic research that emulates nature derives from an attitude
of care and respect as it seeks to maintain these special conditions. This would
involve an appreciation of how these conditions have evolved historically. On
this conception, a molecule that occurs in a technical system will not be the
same as one in a biological system, even if they share the same chemical
composition. Instead of considering the nature or essence of objects in terms
of structure-property relations, nanotechnology is interested in their power or
potency—what they can or what they will be.8 However, it once again remains
an open question and challenge to nanoscience and nanotechnologies whether
they can really integrate such a thick or substantial conception of nature.
7. Even Richard Jones’s Soft Machines [Jones 2004] with its vivid appreciation of
the complexities of “biological nanotechnology” does not reflect the epigenetic findings
of developmental biologists regarding environmental stimuli to gene expression. These
findings complicate immensely the promise of robust nanotechnology.
8. This ontological conception of (not only) nanotechnology’s attractive objects
was the subject of the GOTO project on the Genesis and Ontology of Technoscientific
Objects [see Bensaude-Vincent, Loeve et al. 2017].
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If the thin conception of “everything molecular” yields a fantastically broad
domain of objects, and if a more contextual, thick conception appears to be too
challenging and perhaps too limiting, a third attempt to limit the domain of
objects would foreground instrumental and experimental practice: The domain
of objects and processes does not include all nanoscale objects “out there” but
consists of just those phenomena and effects that are revealed by scanning
tunneling microscopy and other specifically nanotechnological procedures.
It was Peter Janich, in particular, who ascribed to nanotechnoscience a
methodological unity based on common practice [Janich 2006], [see also
Grunwald 2006]. He suggested a philosophical program of systematizing the
operations by which nanoscale objects become amenable to measurement and
observation. Such a systematic reconstruction of the domain of objects of
nanotechnological research might begin by looking at length measurement or
scanning probe microscopy. Unfortunately, however, research practice is not
actually unified in this manner. Even scanning probe microscopy—to many
a hallmark or point of origin for nanotechnologies—plays a minor role in the
work of many nanoscale researchers [Baird & Shew 2004]. Also, the struggles
to attain standard measures, or to characterize nanomaterials, testify to the
unruliness of the objects of research.
In light of the shortcomings of all three approaches, what remains is the
idea that the specific rather than envisioned objects of nanoscale research
are constituted through their particular histories—histories that concern their
origin (in a tissue sample, in the earth, in a chemically produced batch), that
include nanotechnological interventions as well as their location finally in a
technical system. This would promote, of course, the fragmentation of “nan-
otechnology” into as many “nanotechnologies” as there are nanotechnological
devices or applications. If this is so, it becomes impossible to uphold the idea
of carbon nanotubes as all-purpose technical components. If they contribute to
the performance of some product, then they are individuated or characterized
as being carbon-nanotubes-in-that-product. By the same token, they are no
longer conceived as molecular objects that are combinable in principle with
just about any other. The open space of unlimited potential differentiates into
a manifold of specific technological trajectories.
For technology assessment and especially the assessment of risk and safety,
this would imply a shift of perspective from component materials to integrated
systems or devices—a carbon nanotube would be as safe or unsafe as the
product in which it appears.
4 From epistemic certainty to systemic
robustness
The previous sections considered research practices of the nanotechno-
sciences—how theories are stretched to deal with the complexities at the
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nanoscale, how a qualitative methodology serves the construction of likeness
and inferences from that likeness, and how the research objects are individ-
uated and encountered. All these practices contribute to the production of
knowledge, but the sense in which this is “objective knowledge” needs to be
explored. As with more classical science, the findings of nanotechnoscientific
research are published in scientific journals, so the question is, more concretely,
what kind of knowledge is expressed or communicated in a nanoscientific
journal article? Instead of answering this question in a properly detailed
and differentiated manner, a somewhat schematic summary must suffice here
[Nordmann 2012].
A typical research article in classical science states a hypothesis, offers
an account of the methods, looks at the evidence produced, and assesses the
hypothesis in light of the evidence. In contrast to “hypothesis testing”, a
technoscientific research article provides testimony for an acquired capability.
It offers a sign or proof of what has been accomplished in the laboratory
and tells a story of what has been done. The telling of the story does not
actually teach the capability, but it offers a challenge to the reader that
they might develop this capability themselves. As opposed to “epistemic”
knowledge (concerned with the truth or falsity of propositions), nanoscale
research produces working knowledge—that is, knowledge of how things can
work together within a working order.9 Working knowledge can be objective
and public, scientific and communicable. It grasps causal relations, and
establishes habits of action. It is validated or assessed not by the application
of criteria or norms but by being properly entrenched in a culture of practice.
Only propositions can be true or false not attunement to a working order:
by demonstrably acquiring a capability, one can more or less consistently
effect something in an “apparatus-world complex” [Harré 2003]. As opposed
to the truth or falsity, certainty or uncertainty of hypotheses, the hallmarks of
technoscientific knowledge are robustness, reliability, and resilience of technical
systems or systematic action.
This account of working knowledge pushes the question of where the
“science” is in “technoscience” to the fore. The answer to this question
can be found in the very first section above: It is in the (closed) theories
that are brought as tools to the achievement of partial control and partial
understanding. Nanotechnoscience seeks not to improve theory or to change
our understanding of the world but to manage complexity and produce novelty.
As such, nanotechnoscience is technical tinkering, product development, search
for design solutions to societal problems, an attempt to shape and reshape the
9. This particular notion of “working knowledge” originated in [Baird & Nordmann
1994]. It should be distinguished from thing knowledge on the one hand, from
personal skill or tacit knowledge on the other hand. Even when it is non-propositional,
it is based in public performances of construction, maintenance, or repair. It consists
in a demonstrable grasp of how things can be brought to exhibit their capacities in
the context of specific works of human art—as such subject to scrutiny, assessment,
prodding.
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world. However, the conceptual and physical tools it tinkers with do not
come from ordinary experience, from common sense and a craft tradition
but concentrate within them the labors of science. So, the “science” of
“nanotechnoscience” is in the theoretical tools that enter into the research
process. What comes out is working knowledge which cannot be reduced to
scientific understanding or a theoretical description of how things are. As long
as one can produce an effect in a reasonably robust manner, it does not really
matter whether scientific understanding catches up. Indeed, the complexities
may be such that it cannot fully catch up.
The standard example of technology being ahead of science is the steam
engine which was developed without a proper understanding of the relation
between heat and work [Baird 2004]. This understanding came much later
and, indeed, was prompted only by the efficient performance of the steam
engine. The steam engine itself was therefore not applied science but the
result of technical tinkering. It was made of valves, pumps, gears, etc. of
which there was good craft-knowledge—and it worked just fine before the
advent of thermodynamics. In a sense, it didn’t need to be understood.
As opposed to the steam engine, nanotechnological products, genetically
modified organisms, or drug delivery systems are all offsprings of the knowledge
society. They are not made of valves and pumps but assembled from
highly “scientized” components such as algorithms, capabilities acquired by
scientifically trained researchers, measuring and monitoring devices with
plenty of knowledge built in [Winsberg 2009]. The science that goes into
the components is well-understood, but not so the interactions of all the
components and their sensitivities in the context of the overall technical
system. Still, like the steam-engine it may work just fine without being fully
understood. And though one cannot attain positive knowledge from which to
derive or predict its performance, we may learn to assess its robustness.
The fact that nanoscale researchers demonstrate acquired capabilities, and
that they thus produce “mere” working knowledge, creates a demand for
working knowledge also in a social arena where nanotechnological innovations
are challenged, justified, and appropriated. The shift from propositional
hypotheses to actions within techno-cultural systems, from epistemic questions
of certainty to systemic probes of robustness has implications also for the
production of socially robust technologies which requires working knowledge
of how things work in a society.
5 Scientific foundations for an open science
The preceding sections provided a survey of nanotechnoscience in terms
of disciplinary questions (a complex field partially disclosed by stretching
closed theories), of methodology (constructions and qualitative judgments of
likeness), of ontology (a thin conception of nature as unlimited potential), and
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of epistemology (acquisition and demonstration of capabilities). This does
not exhaust a philosophical characterization of the field which would have to
include, for example, a sustained investigation of nanotechnology as a conquest
of space or a kind of territorial expansion.10 Also, nothing has been said so
far about nanotechnology as an enabling technology that might enable, in
particular, a convergence with bio- and information-technologies. Finally, it
might be important to consider nanotechnoscience as an exemplar of a larger
cultural transition from scientific to technoscientific research.
This survey is limited in other ways. It glossed over the heterogeneity
of research questions and research traditions. If there is to be a common
denominator for the nanoscale research, this invites the speculative question:
“What kind of basic science is required by and for nanotechnology?” From
quantum mechanics or hydrodynamics derive the (closed) theories that serve
as the toolkit for nanoscale research. While these are basic sciences, of course,
they are not therefore the basis of nanoscience. What, then, is the basic
scientific research that might properly ground nanotechnologies or establish
nanoscience as a field in its own right? Interestingly, perhaps characteristically,
there are no attempts so far to address this somewhat speculative question in
a systematic way.11 And obviously, one should not expect any consensus
regarding the following proposals.
In terms of empirical grounding or a theoretical paradigm, some call
for general theories of (supra-)molecular structure-properties relations, others
imagine that there will be a future science of molecular and nanotechnical
self-organization, for example [Eberhart 2002], or [Roukes 2001]. Following
the suggestion of Peter Janich (see above), one might identify and systematize
how nanoscale phenomena are constituted through techniques of observation
and measurement—this might render theories of instrumentation basic to
nanoscience, for example [Clifford & Seah 2006], [Marcovich & Shinn 2014].
Another kind of basic research, entirely, would come from so-called
Bildwissenschaft (image or picture-science) that could provide a foundation for
image-production and visualization in nanotechnoscience. Its investigations
might contribute clues for distinguishing visualizations of microscopically
obtained data from animations and simulations. This science might also
investigate image-text relations or develop conventions for reducing the
photographic intimations of realism while enhancing informational content.
10. One implication of this is that nanotechnology should not be judged as the
promise of a future but, instead, as a collective experiment in and with the present
[Nordmann 2007].
11. To be sure, there are piecemeal approaches. One might say, for example, that
a theory of electron transport is emerging as a necessary prerequisite for molecular
electronics [but see Tao 2006]. Also, the giant magnetoresistance effect might be
considered a novel nanotechnological phenomenon that prompted “basic” theory
development [Wilholt 2006]. Compare also [Nordmann 2017].
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A third possibility is to ask whether nanotechnoscience can and should
be construed as a “social science of nature” [Böhme & Schäfer 1983].12 As an
enabling, general purpose, or key technology it leaves undetermined what kinds
of applications will be enabled by it. This sets it apart from cancer research,
the Manhattan project, the arms race, space exploration, artificial intelligence
research, etc. As long as nanotechnoscience has no societal mandate other than
to promote innovation, broadly conceived, it remains essentially incomplete,
requiring social imagination and public policy to create an intelligent demand
for its capabilities. As such a paradigmatically “open science”, it relies
on social scientists, anthropologists, philosophers to realize its ambitions of
shaping a world atom by atom.
A science of mesocosmic order, a science of instrumentation and imaging, a
social science of nature can be conceived as basic to nanotechnological research.
In fact, nanotechnology remains fairly indifferent to any such attempts of
grounding it. What remains then, is the question not of basic science
but of basic technoscience which establishes capabilities of measurement,
intervention, visualization, and thus a mastery of complexity that remain
irreducible to underlying theory.
Instead of a new systematic understanding of complexity at the nanoscale,
nanotechnoscience achieves pragmatic and problematic integrations of pre-
existing scientific knowledge with novel discoveries and capabilities. If one
expects science to be critical of received theories in order to produce a better
understanding of the world, and if one expects technology to enhance trans-
parency and control by disenchanting and rationalizing nature, these pragmatic
integrations appear regressive rather than progressive or even revolutionary.
However, if instead of epistemic certainty one seeks systemic robustness, these
integrations hold the promise of producing socially robust technologies.
6 Collective experimentation
Quite independently of what uses experiments are put to, they consist
first and foremost in the stabilization of a phenomenon in a laboratory—
experiments make something observable, measurable, and replicable that does
not exist as such outside controlled laboratory conditions. This is surely what
nanotechnological experiments do, too. But they do not end here.
12. The term Soziale Naturwissenschaft was coined in the context of the finalization
thesis and refers to a “social science of nature” as well as a “science of social nature”.
Here, this proposal is taken up in two ways. As opposed to matter, materials are
social entities and, as such, objects of this social science of nature—as are molecules
which are defined by their history and situatedness. Secondly, nanotechnoscience
is a program for shaping and designing, that is, for reforming the world. To the
extent that this is also a social reform it is systematically incomplete without societal
agenda-setting: What are the projects, the problems to be solved, the targets and
design norms of nanotechnoscience?
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All the novel phenomena and surprising properties that are discovered in
nanotechnological laboratories mark the beginning of a process of “delocal-
ization” [Galison 1997]. Phenomena leave their place of origin and become
delocalized by being stabilized in the laboratory, then rendered robust enough
to be reproducible under varying conditions in other laboratories, then scaled
up and moved out of the laboratory altogether into the world at large of
technical devices. This process of delocalization aims for a seamless transition
from laboratory to market-place as technical processes or phenomena become
more robust or viable. It is therefore misleading to imagine that these processes
and phenomena are brought to completion in the scientific laboratory and
then handed over or “transferred” to engineers and commercial development.
Instead, the world at large is just a larger laboratory in which these processes
and phenomena can prove themselves.
In order to take literally the notion of collective experimentation in
society as a laboratory, one needs to attend to the various features of
experimentation writ large [Krohn & Weyer 1994], compare [Groß, Hoffmann-
Riem et al. 2005], [Schwarz 2014]. As with all laboratories, this one is
standardized in a variety of ways, and as with all experiments, these require
systematic observation to support a learning process. In particular, the
immersive aspect of experimentation in the laboratories of technoscience and
society deserve to be explored. Where the experimenters and observers
are also the guinea pigs and vice versa, where experiments do not serve
the advancement of truth but the experience and management of surprising
features and effects, the mode and manner of experiencing and observing the
experiments is I believe crucially important.
For social learning from collective experiments to take place, proper
institutions are required for their more or less systematic observation. In
the case of nanotechnologies, the question of regulation is tied in with the
search for such institutions. There is on the one hand the sceptical question
whether current methods of data-collection and monitoring will prove to be
adequate; and there is on the other hand the search for new instruments such
as codes of conduct, observatories, public engagement exercises, citizens and
consumer conferences, as well as “ELSA”-research or Responsible Research
and Innovation. Though vaguely defined and lacking proper agency, these new
institutions serve a general form of permanent vigilance.
7 Observatories and other agencies
Even for observation with the naked eye, it has been shown that it is neither
passive nor neutral but, in the words of Norwood Russell Hanson [Hanson
2007], “theory-laden”. When we see the sun rising and setting, our observation
corresponds to an implicit theory when we “should” be seeing the Earth
turning against the sun. And when a lay-person looks at a prepared tissue
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sample, she tends to see nothing at all, whereas the trained eyes of the
pathologist comprehend the situation immediately and seemingly without an
explicit act of interpretation. The difficult, perhaps intractable question of
immediate, yet theory-laden observation becomes more difficult even in the
case of technoscience and in the case of observing the collective experiment
with nanotechnologies in society.
Ian Hacking famously asked “Do we see through a microscope?” [Hacking
1981]. Discussing light microscopy as well as electron microscopy, he argues
that we do not see “through” an electron microscope as through a tube but
that we see “with” advanced microscopes. We see with them because seeing
is not merely passive or reactive but is based on strategic interventions: We
literally throw light at what we are hoping to see and utilise laws of refraction
to receive an image that we can interpret. Therefore, even in 19th century, light
microscopy observation was wrapped up with an experimental intervention of
sorts. But even though electron microscopy might appear more mediated and
inferential than light microscopy, this does not make it less reliable. One of
the ways in which electron microscopy is highly inferential is the fact that it is
calibrated to light microscopy—it is set up in such a way that it agrees with
light microscopy. So even where, in the end, one does not look through a lense
but at a display screen, the display gives us a way of seeing the world much
as a television set does. For the expert, then, scientific observation involves a
technically contrived effortlessness or mediated immediacy—it is conceptually
complicated and perceptually simple.
With regard to nanotechnologies, Hacking’s question should now be
extended: “Do we see through a scanning tunnelling microscope?” One
of the distinctive features of the STM is that it is used to intervene not
only by making visible but also by way of manipulating the objects under
observation. A second distinctive feature of STM microscopy consists in its
twofold calibration. Its data set is calibrated to electron microscopy on the
one hand, and on the other hand its visual output is calibrated to topographic
software that is used in geography, simulation modelling and video gaming—
this software is best suited for the representation of what goes on at the surface
of a body. Aside from providing the pleasure of experiencing a very familiar-
looking space that stands ready to be colonised by nanotechnology, it stacks
the deck in favor of inferences from the likeness of STM-images and theoretical
models in a computer simulation. Tellingly, these distinctive features make the
STM conceptually even more complicated but perceptually even simpler than
electron microscopy.
Philosophers tell different stories when they consider whether the case of
the STM is just another small step in the history of microscopy or whether
it poses entirely new questions, see, for example, [Pitt 2004], [Rehmann-
Sutter 2014]. But they all agree that it involves an interplay between active
intervention and passive submission or, to put it philosophically, between
spontaneity and receptivity. Indeed, this attitude of the observer informs
the general orientation towards objects of nanoscale research: interesting
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properties that might provide technical functionality are actively sought
out by researchers who are hoping to be surprised by the phenomena they
produce. Also, the appearance of specific phenomena and processes requires
hard work and careful control, but the familiar visual frame of the “sur-
facescape”, for example, opens up an unbounded space for the emergence of
novelty and surprise.
So far, the history of “seeing with microscopes” revolves around realism
or truth: Straightforward seeing is associated with seeing how things are,
whereas a highly theory-laden and inferential mode of perception suggests
that what we see is a construct of sorts. The reliability of a way of seeing—
with the electron microscope, for example—was judged in comparison to
apparently straightforward cases of immediate perception. But the two
features, identified above, of the STM drive home that the reliability of the
observation depends not on representational features but on the technical
robustness and performance of the system. Though STM microscopy is even
more inferential than electron microscopy, the fact that it is also an instrument
of intervention and the fact of its twofold calibration indicate that it cannot
be likened to a human observer who confronts an outside reality and wonders
whether a mental image provides a truthful representation. Instead, the STM
is coordinated with a multitude of other instruments and procedures and
is judged by the way it agrees with and improves upon a whole system of
observational and experimental techniques. Firmly entrenched in a variety of
contexts and practices, the STM is not so much a method of seeing atoms
on surfaces but an “apparatus-world complex” that affords perceptual and
manipulative access to atoms on surfaces.13
Similarly, collective experimentation with emerging nanotechnologies also
requires a robust system of observation that is tied to various institutions
and interests and that is simultaneously a way of seeing and of acting in the
world. Rather than simply registering potential hazards and public concerns,
a systematic observation of our collective experiments should afford a kind of
institutional robustness. When, for example, a commercial “nano”-product
sends users to the hospital for respiratory distress, an observation of this
event should do more than merely represent what happened—what did the
media report, what did the toxicologists conclude, how did the stock market
react? Instead, it needs to view this incident as an experimental situation
that served to probe the robustness of the regime of vigilance that is to ensure
a social learning process—how effectively did existing regulatory institutions,
governmental agencies, public media and the scientific community respond
to this incident, what was learned and what deficits can be identified? To
13. See Rom Harré for an account of the difference between instruments that func-
tion like probes (the thermometer, the light microscope) and a complex of apparatus
and world that makes a phenomenon available for research and development, for
observation and intervention. Of the latter complexes he says that they afford a
phenomenon much like yeast, water and an oven afford us a loaf of bread [Harré
2003].
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make these assessments, to raise and answer these questions, an appropriate
institution is needed [Lösch, Gammel et al. 2009].
8 Parting shot
While there is more than this to the philosophy of nanotechnoscience, this
initial survey might be sufficient to suggest that we should not become fixated
on the imagined consequences of an emerging technology. If there is something
special about nanotechnology and the challenges it poses, it is right in front of
our eyes in the form of a very unusual research enterprise. The main challenge
is to analyze, appreciate, and evaluate it.
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